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ABSTRACT. Are we per haps in the matrix, or anyway, victims of perfect and permanent co mputer 
simulation? No. The most convincing—and shortest—version of Putnam' s argument against the possibility 
of our eternal envattment is due to Cris pin Wright (1994). It avoids most of the misunderstandings that have 
been elicited by Putnam's original presentation of the argu ment in Reason, Truth and History  (1981). But it 
is still open to the charge of question-begging. True enough, the premisses of the argument (disquotation and 
externalism) can be formulated and defended without presupposing external objects whose existence appears 
doubtful in the light of the very  skeptical scenario which Putnam wants to repudiate. However, the argu ment 
is only valid if we add an extra premiss as to the existence of some external objects. In order to avoi d 
circularity, we should run the argument with external objects which must exist even if we are brains in a va t, 
e.g. with computers rather than with trees. As long as the skeptic is engaged in a discussion of the brain-in-a-
vat scenario, she should ne ither deny the existence of com puters nor the existence of causal relations; for  if 
she does, she is in fact denying that we are brains in a vat. 
NOTE. This electronic version of the paper is published here with kind permission of the publishing hous e 
Kluwer. It differs fro m the printed version sty listically, typographically, and with respect to lay out. Section 
headings and one note are added. The arguments are unchanged. 
Does Putnam's Argument Beg the Question against the Skeptic? 
Bad News for Radical Skepticism*)
1. The Rules of the Game 
Whenever you introduce a new philosophy student or a laym an to Putnam' s celebrated 
argument that we could not always have been brains in a vat, 1 she will spontaneously reply 
that the argument begs the question  against the skeptic. This charge can take m any different 
forms. 
One particularly uninteresting version of the c harge relies solely on challenging whatever 
premiss is put forward by the anti-skeptic, cf. Putnam (1994a, 284). A more interesting charge 
of begging-the-question would have to satisfy two constraints. 
First, the skeptic should specify, and keep constant, the skeptical scenario about which she is 
talking, and which she expects us to repudiate. (For example, in a discussion about the 
existence of the past, it would not be fair to suddenly charge the anti-skeptic only because his 
reasoning depended on, say, the assumption that there exist external things right now). 
Secondly, the skeptic should explain in precisely what way the anti-skeptic' s premisses beg 
the question against an argum ent invoking the very skeptical scenario un der discussion. So it 
is not enough to reply to a given prem iss, How do you know it to be true? Rather, the skeptic 
is obliged to show that the anti -skeptic is not entitled to use his premiss within the dialectical 
situation engaging the two opponents. In order to show this, the skeptic must m ake plausible 
the charge that it is the very skeptical scenario under discussion whic h prevents us from 
knowing the accused premiss. 
2. The Skeptical Scenario 
Let us see how the general requirem ents from the preceding section look when the skeptic 
wishes to convince us that Putnam, in his argument, begs the question against skepticism . As 
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to the first of our two requirem ents, the skep tic has little choice. Putnam' s argument is 
designed to prove that we could not have been envatted from  the beginning of our lives. As 
Putnam's argument does not concern itself with perm anent dreams, evil demons and the like, 
the skeptic cannot use these m ore traditional (Cartesian) hypotheses to launch her charge 
against Putnam's argument. As long as Putnam' s argument is being criticized for begging the 
question, there is but one skeptical hypothesis we need fear: th at is, the hypothesis that w e 
have always been brains in a vat.2
Often overlooked is that it already follows that, while evaluating Putnam's argument, we need 
not worry about the existence of the external world: According to the brain-in-a-vat scenario, 
there are external objects, if only a few, cf. Put nam (1998, 256). According to the scenario 
there are, for exam ple, brains and vats. Thus, in obeying our first req uirement, the skeptic 
should not complain that Putnam's premisses presuppose the existence of an external world. 
Let us, for the remainder of the paper, restrict our attention to the following scenario: 
(S) The external world is alm ost empty. There exist only four distinct objects (and, of 
course, their parts plus the m ereological sums thereof): One com puter, one brain, one 
vat of nutrients, and one cable. These four objects do not overlap. They are arranged  as 
follows: The brain is placed in the vat and connected to th e computer by means of the 
cable. The subject' s sensory impressions are id entical to (supervene on / are 
nomologically related to—or what have you 3) brain processes caused by the connected 
computer. 
Our second requirem ent, then, leads to the following qu estion: Does Putnam' s argument 
succeed in repudiating (S) without appealing to premisses that are doubtful, as long as (S) has 
not been ruled out beforehand? 
3. Neither Disquotation nor Externalism were Introduced for Repudiating Skepticism 
In order to answer the question fro m the preceding section, we need to have a closer look at 
Putnam's argument. The argum ent employs two philosophical principles that must be  
checked: disquotation and externalism. Be fore going in detail, however, I' d like to point out 
why the skeptic has no good a priori chance of convincing us that an appeal to disquotation 
and externalism amounts to begging the question against the skeptic. T he reason for this has 
to do with the history of the two principles. Neither of them  was designed specifically for the 
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discussion with the skeptic. Rather,  they have been employed for a number of years without 
any anti-skeptical motive. Let me explain this first for the older of the two principles. 
It was Alfred Tarski who first formulated disquotation principles for truth and reference in the 
course of his epoch-m aking explication of truth. He explicitly stated  that his explication is 
metaphysically neutral.4 But if the disquotation principles  are m etaphysically neutral, they 
won't tell us anything about the situation in which we are stuck. T hey won't tell us, for  
example, whether our sensory experiences derive  from Putnam's famous computer or, less 
exotically, from ordinary sense organs. Thus it will be quite hard for the skeptic to m ake us 
believe that we presuppose too much when we appeal to Tarskian disquotation principles. 
A similar point can be made with externalism . The externalist doctrine was also no t designed 
for the battle with the skeptic, but has em erged from a debate about the reference of proper 
names and natural kind term s, from a debate, that is, which originally did not seem  to have 
any impact on the issue of skepticism.5
The history of disquotation and externalism  being thus, it cam e as a surprise when in 1981 
Putnam conjoined the two principles for his well-known attack on the brain-in-a-vat scenario. 
Putnam seemed to have discovered an anti-skeptical potential in the two principles which no 
one had expected to be there. I think this discovery was a surp rise for Putnam, too. But while 
the entire history of the argum ent does not look m uch like the history of an argum ent 
designed to beg any question, the argum ent could still beg the question, as it were, by 
mistake. In the end, I am  going to show that this is no t so. Let us first,  however, consider a 
version of the argument which does indeed fail because it presupposes too much. 
4. A Failing Version of the Argument 
In the version I have alluded to at the end of the preceding section, the argument runs thus: 
(1) In the language I am actually speaking right now, the word 'tiger' refers to tigers.6
(2) In the language of an envatted brain, the word 'tiger' does not refer to tigers. 
(3) Therefore, the language which I am  actually speaking right now is different from  the 
language of any envatted brain. (From (1) and (2)). 
(4) Therefore, I am not a brain in a vat. (From (3)).7
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It is true, the two prem isses in this argument do not depend on philosophical principles other 
than disquotation (premiss (1)) and externalis m (premiss (2)). But while it seem s initially 
plausible that we can formulate and defend disquotation and externalism without begging the 
question against the skeptic (see below), it is obvious that in the above argum ent these 
principles are used in a way which does presuppose too much. As it stands, the argum ent 
presupposes the existence of tigers. 
To see this, let us imagine there are no tigers. In such a world we would have to face difficult 
philosophical problems as to the truth values of our premisses. You might say that they would 
have to be either false o r senseless; but for the argum ent to succeed we need true p remisses. 
Premiss (2), being a negative statem ent, might even be true with no tigers. (It would, then, 
parallel sentences such as "The word ' four' does not refer to witches" or "There are no
witches"). But this line of thought cannot be extended to the first prem iss, which does not  
contain a negative statement. 
It doesn't help to read prem iss (1) without exis tential import. That is, it doesn' t help to allow 
for its truth, even in a tigerless world, by way of interpreting the premiss as follows: 
(1') In the language I am  actually speaking right now, the word ' tiger' refers to all and o nly 
tigers, 
which would be true if there were no tigers (because then we could say: "In the language I am 
actually speaking right now, the word ' tiger' refers to all and only tigers, namely to nothing"). 
This move might save the argument's first premiss, but it cannot save the argum ent. It cannot 
save the argument because under this interpretation, a word like 'tiger', which does not refer to 
tigers in a given language (of an envatted brain, for example), might also refer to all and only 
tigers, namely to noth ing. (We are still assum ing that th ere are no tig ers). Therefore, our 
second premiss no longer suffices in distinguishing my own language from the language of an 
envatted brain: in both languages the word 'tiger' might lack referents. And thus, the third step 
in our argument might fail to be co rrect—which means that it does not follow from the two 
premisses. 
To be sure, as soon as we have a tiger on our hands, the two prem isses (1) and (2) guarantee a 
difference between my own language and that of an envatted brain. But this shows only that 
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for the argument to go through we must assume the existence of tigers. And whil e such an 
assumption might be readily granted in a discussion a mong, say, biologists, the assumption is 
not innocent in our discussion with the skeptic. This illustrates nicely how the skeptic can 
fulfill the second of our two requirem ents for launching a successful ch arge to the effect that 
the question has been begged (section 1): If the skeptical scenario (S) were to be true, we 
would, sadly enough, inhabit a tigerless world; therefore we cannot assum e the existence of  
tigers in our attempt to repudiate (S); but precisely this we had to assume in the course of our 
reasoning. Therefore, the argument we have been considering does indeed beg the question, 
as the skeptic wants to have it. 
5. Neither Disquotation nor Externalism Presuppose the Existence of Tigers 
The argument from the preceding section fails in a manner that is in structive, revealing that 
we shouldn't despair of the two philosophical principles we have been using in the course of 
the argument. As we'll see in a m oment, both disquotation and externalism  can be applied to 
the word 'tiger' without any presupposition as to the existence of tigers. If this is so,  the only 
problem with the argument is having to appeal to an extra-premiss which says that there are 
tigers. This extra-premiss has nothing to do with disquotation and externalism . Before we see 
how to run the argument without the extra-premiss, I want to demonstrate that it is not built in 
to disquotation or externalism, even when we apply these doctrines to the word 'tiger'. 
As we have seen, there is a reading of pre miss (1) without existential import; but because it is 
all too tempting to smuggle in unwarranted assumptions as the argument goes on, we should 
explicitly exclude any zoologico-ontological commitment: 
(D) If, in the language I am  actually speaking right now, the word ' tiger' refers to som e 
thing, then it refers (in that language) to tigers. 
Obviously, such a principle can be m aintained without any ontological commit ment as to the 
existence of tigers. W hat is more, the principle can be known a priori. We need reflect on ly 
on our notion of reference, and on the way we use quotation m arks, in order to see that (D) 
must be true.8
Let us follow a similar line for externalism: 
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(E) For a word in a given language to refer to tigers, its user m ust have been in appropriate 
causal contact with at least one tiger.9
When articulated in such a way, externalism  does not presuppose too much. For instance, (E) 
could be true even if there were no tigers (and had never been any). In  this case, the principle 
says that no speaker can refer to tig ers. Thus the ontological commit ments of the principle' s 
truth are small; but what m ust we presuppose in defending the principle? Again, not much. 
We can, I subm it, defend the principle on purely a priori grounds. For this we first need to 
reflect what kind of objects we tak e tigers to b e: If they exist, then th ey must be concrete 
objects located in space and time, rather than abstract objects like sets or numbers. Second we 
should realize that there are causal constraints on any reference to concrete objects; in other 
words, we have to rule out m agical theories of reference. Such theories can be, as we know, 
ruled out by performing thought experim ents alone. (Just imagine several twin-earth  
scenarios, and you'll see that our doppelgangers from twin-earth cannot refer to what we call 
'water'...10)
One may protest that in the course of such a d efense we must assum e at least th at there are 
material objects, capable of standing in m utual causal relation. But this is not so, for we can 
defend our principle hypothetically. W e can sa y: No reference to m aterial objects without 
causality. This leaves it open as  to whether there really is such a thing as causality.11 (It also 
leaves open whether we can and  do refer to m aterial objects). Admittedly, there may be no 
conceivable alternative to a world of m aterial objects which is causally organized. 12 But even 
if there is no conceivable alternative, our defense of the prin ciple still does not depend on the 
assumption of a causally structured world.13
6. Two New Premisses 
Let us cast light on the failure of our origin al argument by way of putting  it into a m ore 
explicit form. 
(D) If, in the language I am  actually speaking right now, the word ' tiger' refers to som e 
thing, then it refers (in that language) to tigers. 
(E) For a word in a given language to refer to tigers, its user m ust have been in appropriate 
causal contact with at least one tiger. 
(-1) There are tigers. 
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(0) Envatted brains lack appropriate causal contact with tig ers. (Follows from  how the 
situation of an envatted brain was introduced in (S), cf. section 2). 
(1) In the language I am actually speaking right now, the word ' tiger' refers to some tigers. 
(From (D) and (-1)).14
(2) In the language of an envatted b rain, the word ' tiger' does not refer to tig ers. (From (E) 
and (0)). 
(3) The language which I am actually speaking right now is different from  the language of 
any envatted brain. (From (1) and (2)). 
(4) I am not a brain in a vat. (From (3)). 
When put in this for m, our argument suffers from two de fects. The first one is harm less and 
can be fixed by way of introducing an additional premiss; the second one is insuperable in the 
discussion with the skeptic: it will force us to  reorganize the whole argument (section 7). Let 
us inspect the defects in turn. 
The first problem with our argument in its present form is that the transition from (D) and (-1) 
to (1) is not deductively valid; it is not fully explicit. In order to render the transition valid we 
have to appeal to another instance of disquotation: 
(A) There are tigers if and only if, in the language I am  actually speaking right now, the 
word 'tiger' refers to some thing. 
The reasons for accepting (A) are of course the sam e as those which convinced us of (D), see 
section 5 above; premiss (A) also follows from reflections on our notion of reference and on 
the way we use quotation marks. 
Still, one might want to criticize (A) along the f ollowing lines. On the left-hand s ide of the 
biconditional in (A) we speak about a certain ontological issue, viz., the existence of tigers; 
and on the biconditional's right- hand side we speak about linguistic issues, viz., the reference 
of a certain word from our language. But how can the zoologico-ontological issue depend 
upon facts about language?  After all, the existence of tigers does not and should not 
presuppose people who can speak. (There could be tigers in a world without speakers). 
That's right. But our additional prem iss does not imply any such presupposition. The prem iss 
states an innocent (m erely material) biconditional, whose truth value can be calculated 
according to the m ethod of truth tables. Its truth does no t require an y metaphysically or 
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ontologically necessary connection between its subsentences. W hat I claim is merely that the 
biconditional's truth can be seen on purely a priori grounds. 
To defend this claim  we have to do  two steps. First, let us assum e that there are tig ers. As I 
have formulated this assumption by way of m aking use of my own language, I have used a 
certain word, that is, the word ' tiger'. Using this very word I have spoken about tigers (which 
exist, according to the assumption). Therefore, I have used a word which refers to so mething. 
So, on purely a priori grounds we have seen the truth of the following conditional: 
(A ) If there are tigers then, in the language I am actually speaking right now, the word 'tiger' 
refers to some thing. 
Second, let me assume that there exists som e object to which the word ' tiger' refers (in the 
language that I am actually using right now). So when I say 'tiger', then there exists something 
which bears that biological nam e. Let me do this now, let m e ask (for  example): Are there 
tigers? The answer is to  the positive, of course, because in form ulating the question I have 
used the very word whose referents do exist, according to our assum ption. So the following 
conditional is an a priori truth, too: 
(A ) There are tigers if, in the language I a m actually speaking right now, the word ' tiger' 
refers to some thing. 
Taking the two steps together we arrive at the aprioricity of premiss (A).15
7. Let's Talk about Computers Instead 
Let us add prem iss (A) to the lis t of our premisses. This makes the argument valid; and the 
only reason we cannot be sure about the truth of its conclusion lies in the fact that premiss (-1) 
is dubious in the light of the skeptical scenario  which the argument is supposed to repudiate. 
How can we run the argum ent without that prem iss? Well, tigers are not essential for the 
argument. If we run the whole argum ent with kangaroos, the argument is no less valid. Thus 
we can avoid the dubious appeal to tigers'  existence—appealing to kangaroos instead. But 
while it is encouraging to realize that we can do without tigers, it is certainly not better to rely 
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on kangaroos. The whole zoo' s existence is dubious in the light of the skeptical scenario we 
wish to refute. 
We must run the argument with entities which are not to b e doubted because of (S). W hat 
entities could those be? They would have to be m aterial objects, because otherwise there 
wouldn't be externalist constraints upon reference to them. And they would have to exist even 
under the conditions of our skeptical scenario (S). This gives us the clue. Even according to 
(S) there are som e material objects: a brain, a va t, a computer, and a cable. So let us try the 
argument with computers in place of animals: 
(A*) There are computers if and only if, in the language I am actually speaking right now, the 
word 'computer' refers to some thing. 
(D*) If, in the language I am actually speaking right now, the word ' computer' refers to some 
thing, then it refers (in that language) to computers.16
(E*) For a word in a given language to refer to com puters, its user m ust have been in 
appropriate causal contact with at least one computer. 
(-1*) There are computers. 
(0*) Envatted brains lack appropriate causal co ntact with computers. (Follows from how the 
situation of an envatted brain was introduced in (S)). 
(1*) In the language I am actually speaking right now, the word ' computer' refers to som e 
computers. (From (D*), (A*), and (-1*)). 
(2*) In the language of an envatted brain, the word 'computer' does not refer to com puters. 
(From (E*) and (0*)). 
(3) The language which I am actually speaking right now is different from  the language of 
any envatted brain. (From (1*) and (2*)). 
(4) I am not a brain in a vat. (From (3)).17
Of course, the skeptic rem ains unimpressed. Once m ore she wants to accuse us of having  
begged the question. But while it wa s easy to direct such a charge against the predecessors of 
our present argument, now the skeptic has a more difficult task. Clearly the existence of tigers 
(or kangaroos) is incompatible with scenario (S), which we are out to refute. But the existence 
of computers is m ore than just co mpatible with the scenario; com puters must exist if th e 
scenario is to hold. 
8. Causal Contact to Computers 
Still, there is a number of objections the skeptic might come up with in order to m aintain her 
charge. Let us inspect her objections and begin with the less convincing ones. 
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First objection. While an envatted brain indeed lacks causal contact with tigers (as claimed by 
(0) in the preceding argument), it does have a causal connection to computers; after all, it is a 
computer that generates the brain's impressions of an external world. Thus it would seem that 
premiss (0*) fails to hold. 
It only seems so. The premiss calls for appropriate causal contact with computers. True, there 
is some causal connection between the envatted brain and the sim ulating computer. But 
clearly this does not suffice for reference. 18 The brain does not, and cannot possibly, perceive 
or manipulate the computer. (For example, the brain cannot tell the computer's colour; neither 
can it destroy the computer). Rather the brain interacts with certain configuration s of bits and 
bytes within the com puter. (And according to externalism , then, the brain can refer to those 
bits and bytes). 
9. Externalist Constraints on the Reference of the Term 'Computer'
Second objection. Even if we were allowed to presuppose the existence of com puters, they 
could still be utterly different from  what we take them  to be. In particular, it is not clear that 
reference to computers stands und er externalist constraints. This is an objectio n against 
(E*).19 The objection does not deny that we assume computers to be material objects and that 
reference to material objects is causally constrained. Rather, it is worried that by m istake we 
might have introduced the term 'computer' without supplying the proper kind of referents. (In 
this case, reference to what is called ' computer' need not stand under externalist constraints). 
What if, for example, our notion of com puters derived from hallucination alone? If this were 
true, our w itnessing the cerem ony of baptism for the term ' computer' would ha ve been 
hallucinatory. Even then the term could perhaps refer to something (maybe to certain aspects  
of our hallucinatory images?); but clearly it would not refer to material objects. Doesn't such a 
possibility cast doubt on our premiss (E*)? 
Convincing as this objection may sound within a general discussion of skepticism , it is out of 
place in a d iscussion merely concerned with envatted brains. To substantiate her charge, the 
skeptic resorted to another skeptical scenario (viz., the scenario of con sistent hallucination). 
This violates the first requirem ent we set up at the beginning of our discussion. As Putna m 
does not seek to prove impossible that we are m erely hallucinating, his premisses should not 
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be criticized for failing in the case of hallucination. In a discussion of Putnam's argument, the 
only troublesome circumstances are those which involve envattment. 
Now, what if the term 'computer' had been introduced under such circumstances? Well, then it 
would still refer to m aterial objects; not to real com puters, to be sure. It would refer,  I think, 
to those configurations of bits and bytes (within the sim ulating computer) that are responsible 
for the computer images the envatted brain enjoys. And the reason for this lies precisely in the 
externalist doctrine. Thus externalism is applicable to the term ' computer' as long as we 
confine our attention to the brain-in-a-vat scenario.20
10. What if Computers, Cables, Tigers, and Kangaroos are Bits and Bytes?
Third objection. A m oment ago we said that in the language of an envatted brain the word 
'computer' refers to certain bits and bytes. And we said—repeating step (2*) from  our 
argument—that this word (in the language of an envatted brain) does not refer to  computers. 
But that presupposes that those bits a nd bytes aren' t computers themselves. 21 How do we 
know they are not?  In any case, of course, those bits and bytes are proper parts of a given 
computer. Now, if those bits and bytes were them selves computers, this would imply that 
some computers are proper parts of som e other computers. Why should this not be so?  Some 
mountains are proper parts of some other m ountains; some m outhfuls of honey are proper 
parts of some other mouthfuls of honey. On the other hand, no shoe is a proper part of another 
shoe; and no tiger is a proper part of another tiger.22 It seems that an empirical investigation is 
called for b efore we can tell for sure wheth er, in this respect, computers are closer to  
mountains and honey or closer to shoes and tigers. But we cannot be sure of the result of any 
empirical investigation without first ruling out the brain-in-a-vat scenario. And this m eans 
that we cannot maintain step (2*) from our argument without begging the question—says the 
skeptic in her third objection. 
The objection does not rescue the skeptic, however. W e know, without em pirical 
investigation, that those bits and bytes which are responsible for the brain's enjoying computer 
images either are or are not com puters. If they are not, Putnam's argument works (or anyway 
needs to be blocked by a different objection). So let us assume that those bits and bytes indeed 
are computers, i.e., that they are not only correctly called ' computers' in the brain' s language 
but that they sim ply are computers. By reformulating our reasoning from  (D*) to (4) with 
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cables (instead of computers), we can force the skeptic to apply her objection to the notion of 
a cable. She must claim, then, that certain configurations of bits and bytes (those responsible 
for cable images experienced by the brain) indeed are cables. Similarly, we force the skeptic 
into admitting that certain configu rations of bits and by tes are brains, and that certain o ther 
configurations are vats. A slippery slope: W hy stop here? Certain configurations of bits and 
bytes will turn out to be transistors; others will turn out to be nerve fibers; and still o thers will 
turn out to be tigers. Each material object which the envatted brain seem s to have only an 
image of, will r eally exist (nam ely in f orm of certain bits and bytes). W henever the brain  
enjoys an im age of a kangaroo, there really is a kangaroo (that is, certain bits and bytes 
responsible for kangaroo images). And if, still  impressed by the kang aroo image, the brain 
exclaims: "Lo, a kangaroo!" it will be right. 23 And this is no t an accident: Most of the brain' s 
observation sentences will turn out true.24 It's a little bit odd to call such a situation a skeptical 
scenario. If kangaroo simulations are kangaroos, then the whole subject of simulation loses its 
point, and radical skepticism fades away. 
It is true, P utnam's argument does not work w hen we follow the skep tic's third objection so 
far. But this doesn' t matter; the objection turns the whole scenario in to something which is 
epistemically harmless. If the sk eptic wishes to draw rad ical skeptical conclusions she had 
better come up with another objection. 
11. Logic: Either—Or
The skeptic's fourth objection is an attem pt to attack prem iss (-1*). Admittedly, it is slightly  
odd to start an anti-skeptical argument with the premiss: 
(-1*) There are computers. 
Now, what exactly is wrong with this prem iss in our dialectical situation?  As we saw, the 
skeptic shouldn't say that the truth of the premiss is incompatible with the skeptical scenario  
under discussion. (She shouldn't say this because that scenario calls for at least one computer). 
But the skeptic could say: For an anti-sk eptical argument to succeed it is not enough to start 
from true premisses, because it is no t enough to arrive merely at a true conclusion. What we  
need and want is knowledge; so we m ust start from  premisses known to be true. But we  
cannot know that there are com puters so long as we haven' t ruled out the very skeptical 
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scenario under discussion. The brai n-in-a-vat scenario threatens every claim to knowledge of  
external things; it even threatens our ability to gain knowledge of  those claims whose truth is 
called for by the scenario itself. 
This is a serious objection which forces m e to reorganize the whole argum ent. It is right, we 
shouldn't start with prem iss (-1*). W e should start with som ething less controversial, 
preferably from some logical truth. How about this: 
(L) Either there are computers or there are no computers.25
Let us deal with the two possibilities in tur n. If there are no com puters, then I cannot be an 
envatted brain whose sensory im pressions result from some computer processes; in this case,  
(S) is clearly false. If, however, there are computers, then the whole argument we have been 
considering gains momentum, and (S) is false again. Taking the two cases togeth er we can  
conclude from (L) that (S) m ust be false.  Even without presupposing the existence of  
computers, I know that I am not envatted from the beginning of my life.26
12. Generalizing the Strategy
Let us generalize the strategy that has worked so neatly against the skeptic's fourth objection. 
Suppose the skeptic com es with the objection that Putnam' s argument presupposes 
externalism, which in turn presupposes causality, and thus begs the question. (The skeptic 
might ask: How do we  know about causality ?) To this we reply (in addition to w hat we've 
already said in section 5): Either there is causality—or there is not. 27 If there is no causality , 
(S) cannot be true because according to that v ery scenario my sense im pressions are caused
by certain cybernetic processes. But if there is causality (second case), then with the argument 
we sketched above, we get the conclusion that (S) is false. 
Or again, suppose the skeptic acc uses us of having used prem isses like (E*), which are 
doubtful because we m ight have been m erely dreaming from the very beginning. 28 Then we 
reply: Either I have or I have not been merely dreaming from the very beginning.29 In the case 
of the former, there are no com puters, and (S) m ust be false. If, however, I have not been 
dreaming all along, I am  allowed to em ploy the prem isses from our argument and can 
conclude again that I haven't always been envatted. 
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To be sure, this does not show that I haven' t been dreaming all along. It only shows that the 
skeptic cannot appeal to the hypothesis of false dream s in order to convince m e that I don' t 
know whether I have been forever envatted. That the skeptic, in our discussion, cannot appeal 
to false dreams shouldn't surprise us. From the beginning we have made clear that the skeptic 
should not switch to another skeptical scenario in the m iddle of the discussion—compare our 
first requirement (section 1). Now we know more. Even if the skeptic were to ignore the 
requirement and try to com e up with new skeptical s cenarios, that are in compatible with the 
original scenario (S) and with some of our premisses, she could still n ot maintain her charge 
that Putnam's argument begs the question. Without any circularity we have been able to show 
that we haven't been envatted for all tim e. While this, adm ittedly, is not enough against th e 
whole bunch of scenarios the skeptic m ight have in reserve for a m ore general discussion of  
skepticism, it is more than nothing.30 It is bad news for the skeptic. 
13. Metaphysically Impossible or Epistemologically Impossible? 
But is it really? The skeptic might try a last rescue. She might be willing to grant that we were 
able to prove the truth of the sentence: 
  I am not an envatted brain (from the beginning of my existence). 
But she might ask: Shouldn't we demand more? Shouldn't we demand a proof that we cannot
possibly be envatted? Much depends on how the m odal notion from  this question is 
interpreted. If you interpret it m etaphysically then I m ust confess that I a m unable to prove 
that I cannot be a brain in a vat. The reason for this is that at least two of our prem isses fail to 
hold by metaphysical necessity. The disquotation principles in (A*) and (D* ) exhibit 
contingent features of my language. I could have been  brought up in a speech comm unity 
where the word ' tiger' does not refer to tigers b ut to kangaroos. In fact, of course, I have not 
been brought up in such a counterfactual (but possible) speech comm unity, and this I know a
priori! (See again sections 5, 6). 
But now we are led to another epistemological understanding of the modality in volved in 
what the skeptic wants us to prove: 
  I cannot be a brain in a vat. 
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The modality involved is an epistemological modality, not a m etaphysical one; it is th e 
modality of a priori knowledge.31
And I claim to have proved m y conclusion ("I am not a brain in the v at") on purely a priori
grounds: The proof is (as I hope to have shown) deductively valid, and all its prem isses are a
priori truths. But because aprioricity is closed u nder deductive inferences, m y conclusion is 
an a priori truth, too. (Its status can be com pared to that of the contingent a priori truth "I 
exist"). 
The skeptic was not interested in m etaphysical modalities in the first p lace. She was busily 
asking an epistemological question: How do you know you are not a brain in the vat?  My 
reply is: I know it a priori.
Appendix
Here is a version of the argum ent that accounts for the co mplication mentioned in note 9 
(section 5).32 As prem iss (E*) does only hold for term s that haven' t been introduced via 
description, a more accurate version of the premiss runs thus: 
(E") A word that is not introduced via description to a certain la nguage can only refer to 
computers if its user has been in appropriate causal contact with at least one computer. 
As we have decided in section 11, we won' t use (-1*) as a prem iss; instead we introduce it as 
an assumption: 
(-1*) There are computers. (Assumption). 
The other premisses remain unchanged: 
(A*) There are computers if and only if, in the language I am actually speaking right now, the 
word 'computer' refers to some thing. 
(D*) If, in the language I am actually speaking right now, the word ' computer' refers to some 
thing, then it refers (in that language) to computers. 
(0*) Envatted brains lack appropriate causal contact with computers. 
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Our first step is not new: 
(1*) In the language I am actually speaking right now, the word ' computer' refers to som e 
computers. (From (D*), (A*), and (-1*)). 
Now from (E") and (0*) we cannot infer: 
(2*) In the language of an envatted brain, the word 'computer' does not refer to com puters. 
(From (E*) and (0*)). 
Rather, we have only the following: 
(2") If a word is not introduced via description to the language of an envatted brain, then that 
word does not refer to computers. (From (E") and (0*)).33
But from this and (1*) we cannot immediately conclude that m y language is different from 
that of an envatted brain (as was concluded in  the earlier argum ent); we have to em ploy an 
additional premiss: 
(B) The word 'computer' has not been introduced via description to the language which I am 
actually speaking right now. 
This premiss might be known introspectively (it expresses structural knowledge about my 
own language rather than substantial knowledge about the external world); but even if the 
speaker is not sure about such a premiss when applied to the word 'computer', she can still 
count on an analogous prem iss being applied to som e other word denoting m aterial objects 
different from bits and bytes within the com puter.34 For she can infer from (-1*), by a priori
reasoning, that there have to be some words for material objects (different from bits and bytes 
within the computer) which are not introduced via description: Even if the word ' computer' is 
introduced via description, the description itself can ultim ately rely only on words not 
introduced descriptively. And some of the final constituent words in the descriptive definition 
of the word ' computer' must refer to m aterial objects different from bits and bytes within the 
computer.35 (The com puter cannot m erely consist of bits and bytes, and thus, cannot be 
described merely in terms of bits and bytes). 
As soon as we have something like (B) we can go on as usual: 
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(3) The language which I am actually speaking right now is different from  the language of 
any envatted brain. (From (B), (1*) and (2")). 
(4) I am not a brain in a vat. (From (3)). 
As this conclusion rests on the assumption of (-1*), we have so far no more than this: 
(5) If there are computers, then I am not a brain in a vat. 
But because the brain-in-a-vat scenario cannot hold without computers, we also know: 
(6) If there are no computers, then I am not a brain in a vat. 
From logic we have: 
(L) Either there are computers or there are no computers.36
And this, finally, gives us what we want: 
(7) I am not a brain in a vat. (From (5), (6), and (L)). 
Quod erat demonstrandum. 
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in the second chapter and in the appendix of this book; compare for example (1981, 
13-4 ) on one hand with (1981, 32-38 and 217-8) on the other hand. But there is no 
real contradiction here. In later writings Putn am has m ade clear that he had been  
employing the permutation arguments not against the definiteness of reference but as a 
reductio ad absurdum of metaphysical realism and its views on reference, cf. Putnam 
(1994b, 280-1)). 
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argument as we have r econstructed it so far?  The obvious answer is that then the 
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While some people might feel uncomfortable with such an answer, we should, I think, 
be satisfied with it. It opens the way to a deep understanding of what Putnam's internal 
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22 Let us neglect complications due to pregnancy. 
23 A similar point is made by Putnam (1981, 14). 
24 There are some exceptions though. Suppose the brain has the impression of being lost 
in the Sahara. The brain might say then "There's no fluid wide and far"—which would 
be wrong, as the brain is still located in a vat of nutrient fluid. 
25 Admittedly, this is on ly uncontroversial within classical logic. But even if the skeptic 
does not want to grant us the law of excluded middle, we can still run the argum ent. 
See next note. 
26 If the skeptic insists on a version of th e argument that does not invoke the law  of 
excluded middle (see previous note), we can run the proof as follows. In a first step, 
we introduce two assumptions (-1*) and (S ) (that is, we assum e that there are 
computers and that we are envatted  from the beginning of our lives). From  these 
assumptions we derive a contradiction by way of reasoning along the lines of section 
7. As the skeptic wish es to m aintain (S) as long as she can, she has to deny (-1*). 
Thus, in a second step, we start with (S) and the negation of (-1*). This is even m ore 
easily seen to be a contradiction. ((S) says, am ong other things, that there is a 
computer, which the negation of  (-1*) de nies). Taking the two steps together, 
intuitionistic logic allows us to conclude that (S) must be false. 
27 See previous note for a line of thought that does without the law of excluded middle. 
28 Reminder: Merely dreaming that p is defined as dream ing that p while p is false. T his 
is a stronger hypothesis than one in which the dream  might give a true picture of  
reality; and it opens a more convenient way towards skepticism (which could be called 
"direct strategy", cf. Wright (1994, 218-9, 235)). 
29 See note 26 in section 11 for a line of thought that does without the law of excluded 
middle. 
30 See note 2 (section 2). 
31 In his original presentation of the ar gument, Putnam does not m ake sufficiently clear 
that what matters is epistemological rather than metaphysical necessity. He complains 
about "the tendency in our culture ...  to take physics as our metaphysics" (1981, 15, 
Putnam's italics) and contrasts this tendency with his claim: "What rules out the brain-
in-a-vat  possibility is not physics but philosophy" (1981, 15, Putnam's italics). A little 
earlier on the sam e page he says that the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis is "(necessarily) 
false". These quotations may sound as if Putnam had wished to prove a metaphysically 
necessary conclusion. But he also says that he has come to his externalist premiss (i.e., 
(E*) from our argument) "by reasoning apriori" (1981, 16, Putnam' s italics). And in 
his later writings he distanced himself from appeals to metaphysical necessity (such as 
Kripke's), cf. Putnam (1990, 55, 67 et passim). 
32 The complication itself and the way around it have been brought to my attention by 
James Pryor, although he m ight not agree with the details of m y presentation. This 
appendix owes a lot to his subtle refusals to accept Putnam's argument. 
33 Notice that this step does without any m ention of specific words from the envatted 
brain's language; unlike its predecessor (2*), (2 ") does not talk about the word ' tiger'. 
Thereby we avoid a problem  which has thus far been ignored: If we wish to 
differentiate my language from that of an envatted brain by  way of spotting referential 
differences between my word ' tiger' and the brain' s word ' tiger', then we presuppose 
that the words them selves are the sam e. But this is dubious; an envatted brain can 
neither write nor talk. Therefore, it is more attractive to differentiate the two languages 
by way of c omparing my word ' tiger' to every word from  the brain's language. (2")  
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helps us to do this.—The problem and its  solution are due to James Pryor (oral 
communication).
34 Then, of course, she would have to reform ulate the whole argum ent using those 
objects rather than computers. 
35 You may wonder: Couldn't the word 'computer' be defined in term s of sense-data? To 
this question, very much in the sp irit of Carnap's Aufbau (1979), we could reply that 
Carnap's project was repudiated on purely a priori grounds. But even if this is not  
granted, we still have an answer. If Carnap's project were to succeed some happy day, 
each sentence describing the s tate of the external world could be (in princip le, 
anyway) tested by checking sense-data alone. Radical skepticism  is not an option in 
such a picture. So the skeptic had better not revive good old phenom enalistic 
reductionism.
36 See note 26 in section 11 for a line of thought that does without the law of excluded 
middle. 
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